I am a Professor of Economics (tenure track) at the Ludwig-Maximilians University of Munich (LMU). Prior to joining LMU, I received a PhD from the UC Berkeley Department of Economics.
My research studies the role of firms in the labor market. I collect and combine new survey evidence with administrative data in order to understand how firms' organizational design and HR practices affect labor market outcomes and long-term inequality.
You can contact me per email using firstname.lastname@example.org .
Talent Hoarding in Organizations [Revise & Resubmit at the American Economic Review]
Awards: Young Labour Economist Prize 2021 of the European Association of Labour Economists , W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research Dissertation Award Honorable Mention, Max Weber-Preis 2022 Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Outstanding Poster Award 2021 ACLEC
Abstract: Most organizations rely on managers to identify talented workers for promotions. However, managers who are evaluated on team performance have an incentive to hoard workers. This study provides the first empirical evidence of talent hoarding using novel personnel records from a large manufacturing firm. Temporary reductions of talent hoarding increase workers’ applications for promotions by 123%. By reducing the quality and performance of promoted workers, talent hoarding contributes to misallocation of talent and perpetuates gender inequality in representation and pay at the firm.
Abstract: Addressing female underrepresentation in leadership positions has become a key policy objective. However, little is known about the extent to which the leadership ladder appeals differently to women relative to men. Collecting new data from a large multinational firm, I document the existence of a broken rung: women at lower hierarchy levels are 27% less likely to apply for early-career promotions. Both realized application patterns and large-scale surveys at the firm reveal the role of an understudied feature of promotions—having to assume responsibility over a team—which is less appealing to women. This gap is not accounted for by standard explanations, such as family constraints, risk preferences, confidence, or differences in perceived success likelihood. Instead, my findings suggest that organizations can increase female applications by providing more information about what team leadership entails.
Bargaining and Inequality in the Labor Market (with Sydnee Caldwell and Jörg Heining)
Wage Premia and Worker Search (with Sydnee Caldwell and Jörg Heining)
Selected Work in Progress
Firm Wages and Amenities (with Sydnee Caldwell and Jörg Heining)
Funded by NSF SES #2242439