Published and Accepted Work
Bargaining and Inequality in the Labor Market (with Sydnee Caldwell and Jörg Heining) [Online Appendix] [Slides] [NBER Working Paper] [IAB-Discussion Paper 2/2025] [Upjohn Institute WP] [Upjohn Institute Policy Brief]
Coverage: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
Quarterly Journal of Economics 141(1), February 2026, 315–371
Abstract: We use novel surveys of firms and workers, linked to administrative employer-employee data, to study the prevalence and importance of individual bargaining in wage determination. We show that simple survey questions accurately elicit firms' bargaining strategies. Using the elicited strategies for 772 German firms, we document that the majority of firms are willing to engage in individual wage bargaining. Labor market factors predict firms' strategies better than firm characteristics. Survey responses from nearly 10,000 full-time workers indicate that most workers provide their salary expectations before they receive a job offer. Most outside offers are rejected, with the worker remaining at the incumbent firm. There is substantial heterogeneity in workers' bargaining behavior, which translates into within-firm wage inequality. Firms that set pay via individual bargaining have a 3 percentage point higher gender wage gap.
Talent Hoarding in Organizations
Forthcoming at American Economic Review
Awards: Young Labour Economist Prize 2021 of the European Association of Labour Economists , W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research Dissertation Award Honorable Mention, Max Weber-Preis 2022 Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Outstanding Poster Award 2021 ACLEC
Coverage: Süddeutsche Zeitung, The Economist (2023, 2026), Marginal Revolution, The Visible Hand Podcast
Abstract: Most organizations rely on managers to identify talented workers. However, managers who are evaluated on team performance have an incentive to hoard workers. This study provides the first empirical evidence of talent hoarding using personnel records and survey evidence from a large firm. Talent hoarding is self-reported by three-fourths of managers, is detectable in manager ratings of worker talent, and occurs more frequently under stronger hoarding incentives, proxied by performance-related pay, team size, and talent visibility. Using quasi-random exposure to talent hoarding, I show that hoarding deters internal job applications, inhibiting career progression and altering talent allocation in the firm.
Working Papers
Why Workers Stay: Pay, Beliefs, and Attachment (with Sydnee Caldwell and Jörg Heining)
[NBER Working Paper] Previously circulated as "Firm Pay and Worker Search"
Revise and Resubmit, Journal of Political Economy
Abstract: Workers often remain with their employer despite higher outside pay. This may reflect information frictions or preferences. We surveyed full-time German workers and linked responses to Social Security records. Workers believe pay varies across firms and direct their search toward higher-paying employers. Expected firm-specific pay premia are correlated with administrative pay measures and workers’ amenity valuations. Yet most workers would reject take-it-or-leave-it raises at named destination firms. Separation elasticities are 2-4 when pay levels and growth are known. Attachment varies across firms in ways unexplained by ex ante amenity valuations. Limited mobility is better explained by preferences than information frictions.
The Broken Rung: Gender and the Leadership Gap
Awards: UniCredit Foundation Best Paper Award on Gender Economics 2022, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research Dissertation Award Honorable Mention, Max Weber-Preis 2022 Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften
Coverage: Deutschlandfunk, My Collective Podcast, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Podcast Datenaffäre
Abstract: Addressing female underrepresentation in leadership positions has become a key policy objective. However, little is known about the extent to which leadership appeals differently to women. Surveys with employees from a large multinational firm document that taking on leadership over a team, which is a salient feature of career advancement in many organizations, is less appealing to women than men. This gender difference is not accounted for by psychological traits or perceptions of treatment as a leader. Instead, my findings suggest that women—even those not facing family constraints—perceive the tasks that team leadership involves as more burdensome. Drawing on the universe of job application and vacancy data at the firm, I show that these gender differences translate into meaningful differences in realized career outcomes, and limit the firm’s ability to fill leadership roles.
Firm Pay, Amenities, and Inequality (with Sydnee Caldwell and Jörg Heining)
[NBER Working Paper]
Abstract: We estimate firm-specific amenity valuations using discrete choice experiments embedded in a large-scale survey of German workers linked to administrative records. Workers rank hypothetical offers from real firms they would consider joining, with randomized wages identifying money-metric valuations. Valuations vary substantially across firms and demographic groups, yet a single index performs surprisingly well. Valuations are approximately orthogonal to firm wage premia; they therefore do not offset between-firm wage inequality. However, male-female differences in amenity valuations explain part of the gender wage gap.
Managing Innovation in Firms (with Isabela Manelici, José P. Vasquez, and Francis Wong)
Abstract: Most innovation occurs inside firms, yet little is known about the organizational forces that shape it. We study the role of managers in within-firm innovation using uniquely rich administrative data from a global manufacturing firm that tracks workers’ ideas from invention to patenting and commercialization. Exploiting quasi-random manager switches across teams, we show that managers with hands-on invention experience substantially increase both the quantity and quality of workers’ innovative output. Within four years of the switch, moving from the average manager, who has no experience, to a highly-experienced manager approximately doubles workers’ production of patented inventions. We also find positive effects on patent citations and commercialized inventions, showing that these effects extend beyond patent counts to also reflect technological impact and economic value. Our evidence suggests that managers raise the innovation capability of incumbent workers. Close collaboration transmits know-how, especially in areas farther from workers’ expertise, after which workers become more able to invent independently. We also show that experienced managers foster a work environment more conducive to experimentation and idea development.
