Ingrid Haegele

I am an Economics Ph.D. candidate at the University of California, Berkeley and a guest researcher at the ifo Institute in Munich. My interests are at the intersection of labor and personnel economics.

In 2022, I will join the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) as an Assistant Professor of Economics.

My research studies the role of firms in modern labor markets. In my current projects, I collaborate with large companies to understand how organizational design affects labor market outcomes and long-term inequality.

You can contact me per email using inha [at]

Curriculum Vitae

Working Papers

Talent Hoarding in Organizations [This version: September 2021]

Awards: Young Labour Economist Prize 2021 of the European Association of Labour Economists , Outstanding Poster Award 2021 ACLEC

Coverage: Süddeutsche Zeitung

Abstract: Most organizations rely on managers to identify talented workers. However, because managers are evaluated on team performance, they have an incentive to hoard talented workers, thus jeopardizing the efficient allocation of talent within firms. This study documents talent hoarding using the universe of application and hiring decisions at a large manufacturing firm. When managers rotate to a new position and temporarily stop hoarding talent, workers’ applications for promotions increase by 128%. Marginal applicants, who would not have applied in the absence of manager rotations, are three times as likely as average applicants to land a promotion, and perform well in higher-level positions. By reducing the quality and performance of promoted workers, talent hoarding causes misallocation of talent within the firm. Female workers react more to managerial talent hoarding than their male counterparts, meaning that talent hoarding perpetuates gender inequality in representation and pay at the firm.

Work in Progress

The Broken Rung: Gender and the Leadership Gap

Abstract: Women are vastly underrepresented in leadership positions, but little is known about when and why gender gaps in representation first emerge in the leadership pipeline. This study uses novel personnel data from a large manufacturing firm to document the existence of a major bottleneck in women’s career progression at the transition to first-level leadership positions. This finding contrasts with the common notion that a glass ceiling at higher-level leadership positions is the key barrier to gender equality. I show that the gender gap in career progression is accounted for by gender differences in applications for promotions. Women are not less likely to learn about job openings at the firm. Instead, I find that gender differences in revealed preferences for leading a team drive women’s lower propensities to apply for higher-level positions. I show that increasing women’s exposure to leadership positions may have positive effects on their subsequent career progression.