I received a PhD from the Economics Department at UC Berkeley. During the Spring 2022 semester, I am visting MIT Sloan and the NBER.
In July 2022, I will join the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) as an Assistant Professor of Economics.
My research studies the role of firms in the labor market. In my current projects, I collaborate with large companies to understand how organizational design affects labor market outcomes and long-term inequality.
You can contact me per email using inha [at] berkeley.edu.
Awards: Young Labour Economist Prize 2021 of the European Association of Labour Economists , Outstanding Poster Award 2021 ACLEC
Abstract: Most organizations rely on managers to identify talented workers for promotions. However, managers who are evaluated on team performance have an incentive to hoard workers. This study provides the first empirical evidence of talent hoarding using novel personnel records from a large manufacturing firm. Temporary reductions of talent hoarding increase workers’ applications for promotions by 123%. By reducing the quality and performance of promoted workers, talent hoarding contributes to misallocation of talent and perpetuates gender inequality in representation and pay at the firm.
Selected Work in Progress
Wage Posting vs. Wage Bargaining: Evidence from Linked Survey-Administrative Data (with Sydnee Caldwell and Jörg Heining)