I am an Economics Ph.D. candidate at the University of California, Berkeley and a guest researcher at the ifo Institute in Munich. My interests are at the intersection of labor and personnel economics.
In 2022, I will join the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) as an Assistant Professor of Economics.
My research studies the role of firms in modern labor markets. In my current projects, I collaborate with large companies to understand how organizational design affects labor market outcomes and long-term inequality.
You can contact me per email using inha [at] berkeley.edu.
Talent Hoarding in Organizations [This version: September 2021]
Awards: Young Labour Economist Prize 2021 of the European Association of Labour Economists , Outstanding Poster Award 2021 ACLEC
Coverage: Süddeutsche Zeitung
Abstract: Most organizations rely on managers to identify talented workers. However, because managers are evaluated on team performance, they have an incentive to hoard talented workers, thus jeopardizing the efficient allocation of talent within firms. This study documents talent hoarding using the universe of application and hiring decisions at a large manufacturing firm. When managers rotate to a new position and temporarily stop hoarding talent, workers’ applications for promotions increase by 128%. Marginal applicants, who would not have applied in the absence of manager rotations, are three times as likely as average applicants to land a promotion, and perform well in higher-level positions. By reducing the quality and performance of promoted workers, talent hoarding causes misallocation of talent within the firm. Female workers react more to managerial talent hoarding than their male counterparts, meaning that talent hoarding perpetuates gender inequality in representation and pay at the firm.
Work in Progress