I am an Economics Ph.D. candidate at the University of California, Berkeley. My interests are at the intersection of labor and personnel economics.
In 2022, I will join the Ludwig-Maximilians University of Munich (LMU) as an Assistant Professor of Economics .
My research studies the role of firms in modern labor markets. In my current projects, I collaborate with large companies to understand how organizational design affects labor market outcomes and long-term inequality.
You can contact me per email using inha [at] berkeley.edu.
Talent Hoarding in Organizations [This version: June 2021]
Abstract: Most organizations rely on managers to identify talented workers, but worker departures can be costly and managers are typically not rewarded for developing talent. Consequently, managers may have incentives to hoard talented workers, jeopardizing the efficient allocation of talent within firms. This study demonstrates the existence of talent hoarding by using the universe of application and hiring decisions at a large manufacturing firm. When managers rotate to a new position and temporarily stop hoarding talent, workers' applications for promotions increase by 128%. I show that talent hoarding leads to misallocation of talent within the firm and is particularly consequential for women. Marginal female applicants, who would not have applied in the absence of manager rotations, are almost twice as likely to land a promotion, and ultimately outperform their male counterparts in their new positions. In the absence of talent hoarding, the gender gap in career progression among marginal applicants could be reduced by 91%.
Work in Progress